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THE TRINITY: RELATIVE IDENTITY REDUX 1 
H . E. Baber 
Prima facie, relative identity looks like a perfect fit for the doctrine of the 
Trinity since it allows us to say that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each of 
which is a Trinitarian Person, are the same God (or Being) but not the same 
Person. Nevertheless, relative identity solutions to logic puzzles concerning 
the doctrine of the Trinity have not, in recent years, been much pursued. 
Critics worry that relative identity accounts are unintuitive, uninformative 
or unintelligible. 1 suggest that the relative identity account is worth a sec¬
ond look and argue that it provides a coherent account of the doctrine of 
the Trinity. 
According to relative identity theories it is possible for objects x and y to 
be the same F but not the same G—where F and G are sortals, and x and y 
are Gs as well as Fs. Prima facie, relative identity looks like a perfect fit for 
the doctrine of the Trinity since it allows us to say that the Father, Son and 
Ho ly Spirit, each of which is a Trinitarian Person, are the same G o d (or 
Being) but not the same Person. Nevertheless, relative identity solutions 
to logic puzzles concerning the doctrine of the Trinity have not, in recent 
years, been much pursued. Critics worry that relative identity accounts 
are unintuitive, uninformative or unintelligible—and, in addition, that 
the most plausible relative identity theories do not circumvent the logical 
problems that that the doctrine of the Trinity poses. 
I suggest that the relative identity account is worth a second look and 
argue that it provides a coherent account of the doctrine of the Trinity. 1n 
the first section, 1 consider van Inwagen's relative identity account. 1n the 
second, 1 discuss Trenton Merrick's response, according to which accounts 
like van 1nwagen's should be rejected because relative identity is itself un¬
intelligible. Relative identity theories, particularly those of the Geachean 
variety according to which absolute identity statements are ill-formed, are 
indeed problematic. 1 ague, however, that Merricks has misidentified the 
problems and has not shown that relative identity accounts of the Trinity 
doctrine should be rejected. 
Relative identity accounts of the Trinity doctrine, like van 1nwagen's, 
provide a basis for licensing the inferences we want and avoiding those 
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that are incoherent or theologically objectionable. Most importantly, they 
are metaphysically innocent and theologically noncommittal. This, argu-
ably, is a virtue rather than a vice: whereof we cannot speak, thereof we 
must remain silent. 
I 
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is widely held by critics to be logi¬
cally incoherent insofar as it is committed both to the distinctness of divine 
Persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—and to monotheism. According to 
the Trinity doctrine, each of the Persons is God . But assuming that there 
is just one God, it seems to fol low that Father, Son and Ho ly Spirit are 
identical—insofar as we understand identity as the counting relation. So 
we appear committed to 
(1) The Father = The Son 
However, since we assume that the Persons are distinct we seem com¬
mitted to (2) as well : 
(2) The Father^The Son 
A n d so we have a contradiction. 
One way of avoiding contradiction is by eschewing the language of 
strict identity. O n relative identity accounts, which adopt this strategy, com¬
mitment to monotheism and to the distinctness of Trinitarian Persons is 
held to entail (3) and (4) rather than (1) and (2): 
(3) The Father is the same Being as the Son 
(4) The Father is not the same Person as the Son 
Predicates of the form is the same F as , where F is a sortal term, 
are RI (relative identity) predicates:2 Statements in which they figure, like 
(3) and (4), are relative identity (RI) statements. Relative identity accounts 
of the Trinity replace absolute identities wi th relative identity statements. 
However replacing absolute identity statements (1) and (2) wi th relative 
identity statements is no improvement if such statements "split up" into 
property ascriptions and identities, as they do on the standard analysis of 
relative identity statements: 
Standard Analysis: "x is the same F as y" should be understood to say 
"x is an F and y is an F and x = y." 
O n this account, we should understand (3) and (4) as (3') and (4') re¬
spectively: 
(3') The Father is a Being and the Son is a Being and the Father = the Son 
2 A sortal is generally understood to be a count noun that conveys (or borrows) a crite-
rion for identity. Most importantly for the current discussion, it is substantival rather than 
adjectival. 
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(4') Not (the Father is a Person and the Son is a Person and the Fa¬
ther = the Son) 
Since the Father and Son are Persons, (4') implies that the Father ^ the Son, 
so the contradiction is back. Given the standard analysis, it is not possible 
that the Father be the same Being as the Son but not the same Person. More 
generally, given the standard analysis, for any x, y, and any sortals, F, G, it 
is not possible that x be the same F as y but not the same G as y. 
A l l relative identity theories are incompatible wi th the standard analysis 
of relative identity statements because every relative identity theory is 
committed to 
R: it is possible for objects a and b to be the same F but not the same G, where 
(i) F and G are substantival predicates, designating kinds, rather than adjec-
tival predicates and (ii) a is an F, b is an F, a is a G and b is a G . 
Where a predicate F is adjectival, "a is the same F as b" is not a relative 
identity statement and so does not, on anyone's account, "break down" into 
"a is an F and b is an F and a = b." M y toothbrush is the same color as the 
Golden Gate Bridge but not the same shape. This is poses no problems for 
the standard analysis of identity since identity, at least the identity of partic¬
ulars, does not enter into the picture. R, however, says that it is possible that 
individuals be the same F but not the same G where F and G are substantival 
predicates, so that "a is the same F as b" is a relative identity statement and 
"a is not the same G as b" is the denial of a relative identity statement. 
Secondly, R says that it is possible for individuals to be the same F but 
not the same G in non-trivial cases. O n anyone's account Mark Twain is 
the same person as Samuel Clemens but not the same number as Samuel 
Clemens because Mark Twain, a.k.a. Samuel Clemens, is not a number. 
Such cases are compatible wi th the standard analysis, according to 
which "Mark Twain is the same number as Samuel Clemens" says that 
Mark Twain is a number and Samuel Clemens is a number and Mark 
Twain = Samuel Clemens. That is false—not because the identity fails but 
because the first two conjuncts are false. 1n general, the standard analysis 
allows that a and b be the same F but not the same G in such trivial cases, 
where a and b are neither the same G nor different Gs, because they are not 
Gs at all. R, however, says that even where a and b are Gs, they may never¬
theless be the same F but not the same G—that they may be the same F but 
different Gs. So, once again, R is incompatible wi th the standard analysis. 
Every relative identity theory assumes R. Some accounts, notably the 
relative identity theory originally proposed by Geach, reject absolute 
identity outright. These accounts, i n addition to R, affirm 
D: Statements of the form "x = y" are incomplete and therefore i l l -
formed. A proper identity statement has the form "x is the same F as y." 3 
3 Michae l Rea, "Relative 1dentity and the Doctrine of the Trinity," in Philosophical and Theo-
logical Essays on the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2009), 253. Rea cites Geach, but 
164 Faith and Philosophy 
Others admit statements of the form "x = y" but deny that relative iden¬
tity statements are reducible to them. Either way, relative identity theories 
reject the standard analysis of relative identity statements: on all such 
accounts, sortal-relative identity relations are not reducible to property 
ascriptions plus absolute identity. 
1f the standard analysis of relative identity statements is rejected, then 
(3) does not cash out as (3'), so it is not clear that (3) entails that the Fa¬
ther = the Son or, hence, that it is inconsistent wi th (4). But this, by itself, 
does not show the doctrine of the Trinity to be coherent. Even if (3) and (4) 
do not assert the identity and distinctness of Trinitarian Persons respec¬
tively, they may nevertheless be inconsistent in virtue of the meanings of 
the relative identity predicates " is the same Being as " and " is the 
same [Trinitarian] Person as ." R says only that there are some relative 
identity predicates, being the same F and being the same G, such that it is 
possible that x and y be the same F but not the same G . 1t does not say (ab¬
surdly) that this is the case for all relative identity predicates. Moreover, 
it is an extra-logical matter which predicates behave in this way: clearly a 
great many relative identity predicates do not. 1t is surely not possible for 
x and y to be the same dog but not the same animal—at least not in English 
or in orthodox biological theory. 
For a relative identity defense of the Trinity doctrine, it is not enough 
to invoke R, which says only that some substantival predicates, F, G, allow 
for things being the same F but not the same G. We need to show that Being 
and Person can reasonably be understood to be such predicates. To do this, 
van 1nwagen, who has argued that relative identity can be exploited to 
develop a logically consistent account of the Trinity, provides an account 
of the difference between those pairs of relative identity predicates that 
allow same-F-different-G and those that do not in terms of the relative 
dominance relations amongst predicates: 
Dominance: [A]n R1-predicate I dominates a predicate F (F may be of any 
polyadicity and be either ordinary or R1) if all sentences of the fo rm "1ap 
^ ( F ^ a < > p)" are true. We say that an R1 predicate that dominates 
every predicate is dominant. 4 
R1 predicates may dominate other R1 predicates. " is the same F as " 
dominates " is the same G as " if being the same F entails being the 
same G. Dominant R1 predicates dominate all R1 predicates, so if " is the 
same H as " is dominant, then being the same H entails being the same F 
for all sortals F. O n this account, domination may be mutual, so it is pos¬
sible that being the same F dominate being the same G and vice versa. Indeed, 
to reject R is precisely to hold that all R1 predicates are dominant—that 
is, that for all x, y and sortals F, G, x is the same F as y if and only if x is 
without any page numbers. 1've looked through several papers by Geach but haven't found 
the exact quote. 
4Peter Van 1nwagen, "And Yet They A r e Not Three Gods but One G o d , " in Philosophical 
and Theological Essays on the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2009), 231. 
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the same G as y, where x is an F and y is an F and x is a G and y is a G. To 
embrace R is to hold that some predicates are not dominant. 
According to the standard analysis, every relative identity predicate 
dominates classical identity: that is to say, for all sortals F, if x is the same 
F as y, then x = y. This is what relative identity theories deny. According 
to any relative identity theory, there are some R1 predicates that do not 
dominate classical identity. Van 1nwagen's defense of the Trinity doctrine 
relies on the assumption that the R1 predicate __is the same Being as__ , 
which figures in (3), is not dominant—and in particular, that it does not 
dominate __is the same Person as__ . 1f that is correct, then we cannot infer 
f rom (3), according to which the Father and the Son are the same Being, 
that they are the same (Trinitarian) Person. A n d if this is so, then (3) and (4) 
are consistent and so the doctrine of the Trinity can be coherently stated. 
Relative identity, however, is at least mi ld ly disreputable: it is, as Harry 
Deutsch notes, a "maverick" view that presents "a serious challenge to 
the received, absolutist doctrine of identity." 5 Critics worry that relative 
identity is unintuitive, unintelligible and uninformative, and that it is, at 
least in its Geachean form, committed to some objectionable form of anti-
realism. Some objections to relative identity solutions to the Trinity puzzle 
therefore are, more broadly, objections to relative identity. So some critics, 
including Trenton Merricks, hold that because relative identity is in and 
of itself objectionable, it is a non-starter for any account of the Trinity. 1 
suggest that relative identity is in good order 6 and provides a logically 
coherent account of the Trinity doctrine. 
II 
Trenton Merricks argues that relative identity is unintelligible and has 
consequences that are false: 
[P]retend for a moment that the thesis of relative identity is true. So let's pre-
tend, for example, that being the same dog as does not entail being the same as 
(i.e. being identical with). But then we must admit that we have no idea what 
the relation of being the same dog is supposed to be. A n d it seems that all al¬
leged "relative identity relations" are likewise unintelligible. 7 
Relative identity does not, however, block intuitively correct inferences. 
If being the same dog dominates identity, then the entailment goes through— 
it just doesn't go through by the logic of identity alone, but rather depends 
5 H a r r y Deutsch, "Relative 1dentity," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007, http://plato 
.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/. 
6 For an exploration of the logics of relative identity, axiomatized by means of sound and 
complete sequent calculi see Pawel Garbacz, "Logics of Relative 1dentity," Notre Dame Journal 
of Formal Logic 43 (2002), 27-50. 
7Trenton Merricks, "Split Brains and the Godhead," in Knowledge and Reality: Essays 
in Honor of Alvin Plantinga on His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Thomas M . Crisp , Matthew Da-
vidson, and Dav id Vander Laan (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2006). 1 retrieved this paper 
f rom https://pages.shanti.virginia.edu/merricks/files/2010/05/The-Godhead.pdf. The page 
number f rom that version of the paper is p. 5. 
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on the character of the R1 predicate being the same dog. Even for Geach-
style relative identity accounts, which reject classical identity, there are 
still ample entailments given that being the same dog is dominant, so that 
for every available predicate F, where x and y are Fs, x is the same dog as y, 
entails that x is the same F as y. Assuming D, we cannot of course infer that 
x = y. 1ndeed, as Merricks notes, we cannot say that anything is absolutely 
identical wi th itself since on such an account the absolute identity predi¬
cate is not available. However, if x is a dog, we can infer that x is the same 
dog as x. A n d , since dog is dominant, if x is the same dog as y, we can infer 
that x is the same animal as y. We can infer also that if x is brown, weighs 
seventy pounds and prefers chasing cats to chasing cars, the same is true 
of y. We have everything else non-philosophers, who rarely use the lan¬
guage of absolute identity, could want. Given the richness of entailments, 
it is hard to see what more could be needed for intelligibility: even if we 
don't have absolute identity, for all practical purposes, sortal dominance is 
just as good. Merricks has not shown that without absolute identity being 
the same dog or any other relative identity predicates are "unintelligible." 
Merricks, however, is even less sympathetic to what he styles "attenu¬
ated" relative identity theories, which admit absolute identity, and does 
not think they provide an acceptable account of Trinitarian claims. 
The attenuated relative identity theorist says that identity is relative only 
wi th respect to the Trinity . . . so being the same God as, besides being un-
defined, turns out to be unlike paradigm cases of being the same F as, all of 
which involve absolute identity. 1n light of this, the objection that relative 
identity relations are unintelligible is even more compelling. 8 
Again, it is hard to get a grip on this objection. The difference between 
being the same God and what Merricks takes to be paradigmatic R1 predi¬
cates is that being the same God is not dominant and, in particular, that it 
does not dominate being the same (Trinitarian) Person. But it does dominate 
a range of other predicates, e.g., being omnipotent, being omniscient, and 
being the same Being. 1f the Father is the same G o d as the Son, it follows that 
the Father is omnipotent if and only if the Son is omnipotent, that the Fa¬
ther is omniscient if and only if the Son is omniscient and, for that matter, 
that the Father is G o d if and only if the Son is God . Being the same God 
does not however dominate being the same Person or any of the hypostatic 
predicates that are characteristic of Trinitarian Persons individually. The 
Father is the same G o d as the Son, but it does not fol low that the Father 
is the same Trinitarian Person as the Son, or that the Father was crucified 
if and only if the Son was crucified, or that the Father begets the Son if 
and only if the Son begets the Son, or that the Son is begotten but also 
unbegotten, insofar as the Father is unbegotten. Since being the same God 
does not dominate being crucified, being begotten, and a range of other hypo-
static predicates, a relative identity account can avoid Patripassionism, the 
8 Merr icks , "Split Brains and the Godhead," 8. 
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doctrine that the Father suffered on the Cross, and a variety of other 
heresies and incoherent theological doctrines. 
Dominance 
This account, however, poses a question: what induces dominance? Prima 
facie it seems that, without some principled way of determining dominance 
relations amongst predicates, this solution to the Trinity puzzle is, at best, 
ad hoc. To solve the puzzle, we announce that Being does not dominate 
Person but rather that Person dominates Being—hence that Father, Son and 
Ho ly Spirit are the same Being but not the same Person. Without some prin¬
cipled way of accounting for dominance, the objection runs, this seems no 
more than an unsubstantiated assertion. 1f Person dominates Being but not 
vice versa, what makes that so? 
This is, however, asking too much: dominance is theory-relative. The 
best we can do is give a principled account of dominance in a theory since, 
according to relative identity accounts, it is the resources of the theory in 
which sortal relative identity statements figure that determine dominance 
relations and license inferences. Theories are linguistic entities and domi¬
nance is a grammatical category. There is no dominance, in the relevant 
sense, in the order of nature: in extra-linguistic reality, things can no more 
be dominant than they can be nominative or dative. Moreover, enriching 
a theory with additional predicates that allow for finer distinctions is 
metaphysically innocuous: Geach's aim in introducing the Relative 1den-
tity Thesis was precisely to avoid the repugnant conclusion that ideology 
drives ontology. Geach complains that Quine's criterion for ontological 
commitment, because it assumes absolute identity, does just this: 
[A]s our knowledge expands we should unhesitatingly expand our ideol¬
ogy, our stock of predicables, but should be more wary about altering our 
ontology. . . . A n admirable aim; but one that we cannot attain by Quine's 
device of reading strict identity into 1-predicables.9 
Relative identity, to this extent, "leaves everything as it is." 
Consider a stock case i n which we might say that different passengers 
are the same person, e.g., that the occupant of Seat 6a on last week's flight 
to Baltimore is a different passenger f rom the occupant of Seat 17c on today's 
flight to San Diego, but the same person. Air l ine Theory is rich enough to 
distinguish between the occupants of those seats because its predicates in¬
clude seat designators and the relation of legal seat occupancy. People are 
the same passenger if and only if they legally occupy the same seat on the 
same flight; therefore, 6a to Baltimore and 17c to San Diego are the same 
person but different passengers. Passengers are people, and wherever x 
is the same passenger as y, x is the same person as y. That is to say, pas¬
senger dominates person. But person does not dominate passenger. To be the 
same passenger you need to satisfy not only the conditions for same person 
9Peter Geach, "1dentity," Review of Metaphysics 21, no. 1 (1967), 8-9. 
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(whatever they are), but also certain conditions concerning reservations 
and ticketing, fight times, destinations, and seat designations. 6a and 17c 
fail to meet those additional conditions and so are the same person but 
different passengers. 
Passengers, however, can only fail these conditions if the conditions 
are available. Consider Air l ine Theory Minus , which lacks the resources 
to distinguish passengers by legal seat occupancy but is, in every other 
respect, like Air l ine Theory. 1ts ideology does not include any of the 
familiar customer service predicates, such as "reservation," "confirmation 
number," "ticket," "flight number" or "seat": i n Air l ine Theory Minus , 
the only predicates available for distinguishing passengers are those that 
distinguish persons. 1n Air l ine Theory Minus , therefore, dominance is 
mutual: passenger dominates person, and person dominates passenger so 
that you have the same person if and only if you have the same passenger. 
1n Air l ine Theory proper, a richer theory that includes all the standard 
airline customer service predicates, person does not dominate passenger: 
Airl ine Theory proper has the resources to distinguish passengers by dif¬
ferences in legal seat occupancy, so that the same person may be different 
passengers. 
According to advocates of relative identity, enriching or impover¬
ishing the ideology of a theory does not expand or diminish its ontology. 
1ntroducing a stock of customer service predicates and criteria for indi¬
viduating passengers does not bring entities of a new k ind into existence: 
passengers are just people. A n d people don't dominate: predicates do. 
Dominance is a grammatical feature of predicates, like "passenger," that 
marks entailment relations. 1f 6a is the same passenger as the one who picks 
up the first bag on BW1 Airport Carousel #3, then 6a is the same person as 
that individual . Dominance depends upon a theory's stock of predicates 
and, most importantly, on its sortals, which convey identity criteria, that is, 
shortlists of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the identity of 
objects of that sort. A sortal predicate F dominates a predicate G within a 
theory if the theory has predicates that figure in the identity criteria for F 
to distinguish individuals as different Fs but do not distinguish them as 
different Gs. 
Theology and "Naturalness" 
Some theories have the resources to distinguish the same person as 
different passengers; others recognize different persons as the same 
"surmen," where different men are the same surman if they have the same 
surname, and a surman is a man who bears this relation to someone. 1 0 
Relative identity does not adjudicate between theories: those that admit 
surmen or distinguish amongst passengers who are the same person are 
as good as any others. 
1 0 The surman example is f rom Geach. See "1dentity," 10-12. 
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1ntuitively, however, some theories are more "natural" than others. So 
counting by person seems to reflect distinctions in the wor ld as it is apart 
f rom human interests and linguistic trickery in a way that counting by 
airline-theoretic passenger or by Geachean surman does not. Merricks wor¬
ries that relative identity accounts of the Trinity doctrine—van 1nwagen's 
in particular—are unintuitive or "unnatural." A n d , he writes, "once we 
open the door to less-than-most-natural glosses [of Trinitarian claims] 
. . . there is—absent further argument—no reason to accept the relative 
identity gloss as opposed to some other." 1 1 Given the theological subject 
matter, however, it is hard to see how any account of the Trinity doctrine 
could be natural or intuitive. Our intuitions arise f rom extensive dealings 
with ordinary, middle-sized spatio-temporal objects, and have less pur¬
chase on other items—including abstracta and some of the extraordinary 
objects of fundamental physics. G o d is in any case sui generis. 1t should 
hardly be surprising if accounts of the Trinity doctrine and other theolog¬
ical dogmas are unnatural and unintuitive: divine properties are peculiar, 
and theology is speculative. 
More to the point, it is not clear that the specter of competing accounts 
is a problem. 1n the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity we have what ap¬
pears to be an inconsistent set of propositions. 1s there some interpretation 
according to which all of them come out true? 1t seems so: prima facie, rela¬
tive identity theories provide a model. 1f there are other models, so much 
the better. So van 1nwagen writes, "1 wish only to propose a way of stating 
that doctrine that can be shown to be free f rom formal inconsistency. 
Whether the doctrine so stated, actually is the catholic faith (which 1 mean 
to keep whole and undefiled) w i l l be a matter for further discussion." 1 2 
The aim of his relative identity account is not to produce an account of the 
Trinity doctrine that is natural, plausible or intuitive, or to expound the 
doctrine of the Trinity that figures as an essential component of Christian 
orthodoxy. The goal is just to show that the doctrine can be coherently 
formulated. O n this account there is no question of how we know that 
(Trinitarian) Person dominates Being but not vice versa in Trinity Theory 
any more than there is a question of how we know passenger dominates 
person but person does not dominate passenger in Air l ine Theory: it is a 
feature of Trinity Theory. 
Trinity Theory, like Air l ine Theory, is a human creation but, like Air l ine 
Theory, it purports to be about a state of affairs that is not "merely sub¬
jective." Air l ine Theory is an account of social facts that concern people 
and their actions, airline seats, airline accounting systems, and social in-
stitutions. 1 3 Trinity Theory is an account of objective facts about divinity. 
The relative identity strategy for making sense of Trinity Theory, whether 
1 1 Merr icks , "Split Brains and the Godhead," 7. 
1 2 Van 1nwagen, "And Yet They A r e Not Three Gods but One G o d , " 221. 
1 3 For a discussion of social facts see, e.g., John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 
(New York: The Free Press, 1995). 
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Geachean or otherwise, does not commit one "to the view that the very 
existence of the divine Persons is a theory-dependent matter."1 4 Moreover, 
as an articulation of Trinity Theory, the Relative 1dentity account is not 
an additional Trinitarian theology on all fours wi th various versions of 
Social and Latin Trinitarianism. 1t is a way of making sense of the claim 
that G o d is one Being i n three Persons, which figures in all orthodox and 
some heterodox accounts. 1t does not have anything to say about whether 
Trinitarian Persons are distinct centers of consciousness, whether the Ho ly 
Spirit proceeds f rom Father and Son or f rom the Father alone, whether 
the Son is equal to the Father or subordinate, whether Father, Son and 
Ho ly Spirit are modes or parts of a divine Being or Persons as understood 
by orthodox Nicene accounts, or whether the Persons are, in some sense, 
grounded in the Trinitarian Godhead or vice versa. 
Relative identity accounts explain how we should understand R1 predi¬
cates within a theory. They do not provide any means for selecting amongst 
theories. Trinity Theory features hypostatic predicates, including begets 
and proceeds, that distinguish divine Persons but not divine Beings, so in 
Trinity Theory the Father, who begets the Son, and the Son, who is begotten, 
are different Persons but the same Being. The non-Trinitarian monotheistic 
theories of other Abrahamic religions do not have hypostatic predicates, 
which serve to distinguish Persons, and so they recognize only one divine 
Person. Relative identity accounts do not address the question whether 
Trinitarian theism is theologically superior to non-Trinitarian monotheism 
and are, to that extent, metaphysically innocent. The worry that the rela¬
tive identity strategy is incomplete without a "supplemental story about 
the metaphysics underlying R1 relations," suggested by Michael Rea and 
others, is therefore beside the point. 1 5 The aim is to show that the doctrine 
is logically coherent—not to produce a substantive theology or theologi¬
cally informed metaphysics. A n d that, arguably, is all that philosophers 
qua philosophers can do. Relative identity accounts have nothing to say 
about whether Trinity Theory cuts along the theological joints in a way 
that alternative ways of understanding supernatural reality do not. They 
are theologically non-committal. A n d that, arguably, is a virtue. 
Conclusion: Relative Identity Redux 
Relative identity accounts of the Trinity doctrine are among the most 
promising attempts to make sense of the doctrine without either con-
founding the Persons or dividing the Essence of G o d the Trinity. O n such 
accounts we hold that the Father is the same Being (or the same God) as 
the Son but not the same Trinitarian Person and, consequently, that Father 
1 4 Michae l C . Rea, "Relative 1dentity and the Doctrine of the Trinity," in Philosophical and 
Theological Essays on the Trinity, ed. Thomas M c C a l l and Michael Rea (Oxford: Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 2009), 252. 
1 5 Ibid. 
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and Son have the same generically divine properties, but different specifi¬
cally hypostatic properties, which are peculiar to the Persons individually. 
Merricks's dismissal of relative identity is hasty: he has not shown that 
this account is a non-starter. The Fathers of the Church, who concerned 
themselves wi th the Doctrine of the Trinity in the third, fourth and fifth 
centuries, d id not have the logical machinery that we have. 1f they had 
then, arguably, they would have given relative identity accounts a serious 
look. 1 suggest that we do likewise. 
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